PATENT DAMAGE STRATEGIES AND THE
ENTERPRISE LICENSE: CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE, ACTUAL NOTICE, NO NOTICE
JAMES W. SOONG1

ABSTRACT
For the patent owner, early provision of patent notice can help
maximize recoverable infringement damages during subsequent
litigation. This iBrief recognizes a growing trend of infringement
suits predicated on patented enterprise software technology, and
analyzes application of patent notice principles against industry
convention. This iBrief examines the licensing paradigm of
enterprise software and questions whether mechanical compliance
with the marking statute should qualify as constructive notice.
Borrowing from analogous Federal Circuit principles, this iBrief
concludes by proposing alternate notice theories that would
empower patentees to seek increased remedies consistent with
industry reality, case law, and fundamental statutory purpose.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
For the patent owner, early provision of patent notice can help
maximize recoverable infringement damages during litigation. The
interplay of industry convention and enforcement strategy typically informs
the particular manner chosen by the patentee to effect such notice. In the
enterprise software2 industry, patentees face unique notice considerations
posed by a distribution paradigm restricting access to software products.
Such restricted access hides software products and patent listings therein
from the public, and thus may preclude compliance with the marking
statute. Nonetheless, patentees of enterprise software can still assert

1

J.D., University of California at Davis King Hall School of Law; B.S. in
Electrical Engineering, University of California at Los Angeles. The author
currently serves as Director of Intellectual Property, Legal Affairs for Siebel
Systems, Inc. This iBrief reflects the present beliefs of the author and should
not be attributed to past, current, or future employers or clients. The author
thanks Mr. Brett Stohs and the staff of the Duke Law & Technology Review for
their editorial assistance.
2
The term “enterprise software” generally means software intended for an
enterprise. One meaning of “enterprise” is a business organization. E.g.,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/e/enterprise.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2005);
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Thereon).
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alternative notice theories to preserve legal remedies consistent with case
law and fundamental statutory purpose. As high-stakes patent litigation in
the enterprise software industry continues to grow,3 so too will strategic
application of notice principles to optimize the potential scope of
recoverable patent damages.4

I. SHOULD PATENT LISTINGS ON ENTERPRISE SOFTWARE QUALIFY
AS MARKING?
A. The Marking Statute and Its Purposes
¶2
Section 287(a) of title 35 in the United States Code (“section 287”
or the “marking statute”), permits patentees to “mark” a product when the
product embodies patented technology.5 The patentee “marks” the product
“either by fixing thereon the word ‘patent’ or the abbreviation ‘pat.’,
together with the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the
article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or
more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.”6 Compliant
marking of patented products is a form of constructive notice to infringers,
allowing recovery of full patent damages sustained after provision of such
notice.7

3

See Steven Andersen, IP Law Comes of Age: IP Enters the No-Holds-Barred
World of Complex Business Litigation, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 2004, at 48,
53 (noting a “spike” in the number of software patent cases).
4
Patent damages can be lost profits or reasonable royalties. See Panduit Corp.
v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978);
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121
(S.D. N.Y. 1970).
5
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000). The marking statute states in pertinent part:
Patentees . . . making, offering for sale, or selling . . . any patented
article . . . may give notice to the public that the same is patented, either
by fixing thereon the word “patent” or the abbreviation “pat.”, together
with the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the
article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein
one or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice. In
the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the
patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the
infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe
thereafter . . . .
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. Under section 287, infringers are liable for patent damages no later than
when they are notified of the patent. See infra ¶ 21 (explaining that damages
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As found by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, the related purposes of the marking statute are:
¶3

1. Helping to avoid innocent infringement;
2. Encouraging patentees to give notice to the public that
the article is patented; and
3. Aiding the public to identify whether an article is
patented.8
The public may rely on the absence of patent marking on an article to
signify that the article may be freely reproduced.9 According to the
Supreme Court, the marking statute most fundamentally helps protect
against deceptive distribution of unmarked, patented articles that the public
could mistakenly believe are in the public domain.10
¶4
The marking statute allows patentees some discretion regarding the
marking’s placement. Marking is permitted on packaging instead of the
article itself when the latter is physically impossible.11 Package marking
may also be permitted when, “for reasons that go to the very purpose of the
statute, marking the article itself would not provide sufficient notice to the

liability can sometimes begin prior to receipt of notice). Compliance with the
marking statute requires consistently marking substantially all of the patented
products. Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537-38 (Fed.
Cir. 1993). Section 287 recognizes the patentee’s filing of an action for
infringement as one kind of actual notice. § 287(a). Another kind of actual
notice is receipt of a patentee’s letter alleging infringement. See Lans v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (requiring that actual
notice be an “affirmative act on the part of the patentee which informs the
defendant of infringement”).
8
Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In
describing the purpose for the marking statute and its subsequent revisions, the
American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) has remarked that
“[t]he legislative history … implies that the protection of the public probably
was the strongest factor leading to the passage of the patent marking statutes.”
Memorandum from Jeffrey I.D. Lewis, Patent Litigation Committee Chair, and
Mark Schuman, Patent Marking Subcommittee Chair, on Patent Marking Statute
35 U.S.C. § 287(a), to AIPLA Patent Litigation & Patent Law Committee
Members 7 (April 9, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law & Technology Review).
9
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989).
10
Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398 (1936)
(“Under the interpretation which we accept, § 4900, R.S., [the predecessor to
section 287] . . . provides protection against deception by unmarked patented
articles, and requires nothing unreasonable of patentees.”).
11
§ 287(a) (providing that patent notice should appear on the product but “when,
from the character of the article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the
package wherein one of more of them is contained” a similar notice).
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public.”12 However, when the patented article has other writings, the patent
listing must appear on the article.13

B. The Reality of Enterprise Software Access
¶5
Distribution and use of enterprise software are subject to significant
restrictions. Unlike off-the-shelf consumer software for purchase by
virtually anyone, the availability of an enterprise software license largely
depends on the software owner’s preferences and policies. A typical
enterprise license grants a customer, including its employees and sometimes
others, limited rights to use the enterprise software under various terms and
conditions.14 As a competitive safeguard, enterprise software owners
typically discourage or forbid rival companies from licensing or otherwise
accessing their products.
¶6
Even when a customer is found to qualify as a permitted licensee,
the enterprise license may still restrict the scope of potential end users.
While contractual provisions for enterprise software use are as varied as
software products themselves, a few contractual restrictions commonly
appear in these licenses:

12

Rutherford v. Trim-Tex, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 158, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
Id. at 163 (“Where the patented article has markings or printing on it, other
than the appropriate patent marking, then the alternate form of patent marking
on the package is not sufficient compliance with the statute.”); Pierre Yanney,
The Patent Marking Statute, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, July 2001, at 16,
16 (citing Creative Pioneer Prods. Corp. v. K-Mart Corp., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1841,
1847-48 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (mem. and order on damages) for the proposition that
patent marking on packaging when an article contains other printing does not
comply with the marking statute). The Rutherford court further explained:
13

The rationale behind stricter conformity to the marking provisions of
§ 287 when the article contains other markings is bound-up with the
purpose of the statute to give notice to the public. Where the public
finds markings or writings upon the article itself, the public should be
able to rely upon the fact that a patent, if it exists, should also be noted
with that writing. The notice required by the statute is most effective
when it can be easily seen by the users of the article.
Rutherford, 803 F. Supp. at 163-64.
14
See, e.g., Oracle License and Services Agreement § C, at
http://www.awaretechnologies.com/aware.pdf/2.6/OLSA.pdf (form agreement)
(“You may allow your agents and contractors to use the programs for this
purpose and you are responsible for their compliance with this agreement in
such use.”).
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Transferability: Licenses that are deemed personal
often forbid the customer’s transfer or assignment of
rights to others.15

•

End User Restrictions: Licenses may restrict the
potential pool of end users to, for example, only those
customer employees specifically named in the license
or to a maximum number of unnamed concurrent
users.16

•

Confidentiality: Licenses often characterize enterprise
software as the licensor’s proprietary information that
cannot be divulged by the licensee or its end users.17
Under such a nondisclosure obligation, the licensee
may be forbidden from disclosing information
regarding the screens, functionality, code, business
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See, e.g., id. § D (“You may not . . . make the programs or materials resulting
from the services available in any manner to any third party . . . .”).
16
See David M. Ewalt, Price-Hike Surprise, INFORMATIONWEEK, Oct. 27,
2003, at 24, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=15600387
(noting industry adoption of licensing provisions based on concurrent users and
named users). Prices charged for an enterprise software license are often
proportional to the number of licensed end users. See id. (identifying
controversy over pricing schema based on concurrent users versus named users).
Many other restrictions on use may exist. For example, the enterprise software
may be licensed on a per server or per site basis. See, e.g., New Oracle Site
License, I.T. Times, Dec. 1995, at
http://ittimes.ucdavis.edu/v4n4dec95/oracle.html (announcing new Oracle site
license). License termination can require the licensee to stop all access and use
of the product on certain conditions. See, e.g., Software License Agreement
between Informix Software, Inc. and GeoCities § E(2)(a) (signed June 30,
1998), at
http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agreements/geocities/informix.lic.1998.0
6.30.html.
17
See MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON COMPUTER LAW § 6.24[A] (Supp. 2001).
The exact language of the confidentiality provision varies. Some provisions
may categorically require secrecy over the entire software product. Other
provisions may carve out from the restriction information that is or becomes part
of the public domain without fault of the licensee. See, e.g., Software License
and Services Agreement between Blue Martini Software, Inc. and Bluefly Inc., §
10, at http://contracts.onecle.com/bluefly/martini.lic.2002.03.12.shtml
(identifying, for example, “know-how, processes, apparatuses, equipment,
algorithms, software programs, software source documents, and formulae
related to the current, future and proposed products and services of each of the
parties” as confidential information).
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process flows, and other components of the enterprise
software.18
¶7
Other protections prevent disclosure of enterprise software cloaked
under these common restrictions. When a license is purchased, enterprise
software, as stored in a transportable medium, is often readied for direct
delivery from a manufacturing facility to the customer. In that situation, the
product is typically packaged and boxed under seal for shipment whereby
little, if anything, can be surmised about the enterprise software inside. As
another access control, “keys” may be confidentially provided to the
customer to unlock only the paid-for, licensed portions of the software
functionality embodied in the storage medium. Keys help to prevent
unpermitted access by both licensees and others. Clearly, owners of
enterprise software implement various measures to significantly restrict
access to their product and, as a result, patent markings therein.19

C. Enterprise Software Marking and Unpromoted Statutory
Purposes
¶8
In the enterprise software context, the patented product to be
marked, if any, is usually a storage device.20 Thus, marking under section

18

SCOTT, supra note 17, at § 6.24[A]. See, e.g., Software License and Services
Agreement between Blue Martini Software, Inc. and Bluefly Inc., § 10, at
http://contracts.onecle.com/bluefly/martini.lic.2002.03.12.shtml.
19
See Ronald A. Cass, Copyright, Licensing, and the “First Screen”, 5 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 46 (1999) (noting that license terms are not
unilaterally determined by licensors independent of licensee preferences).
20
In the U.S., patent claims often recite a computer-readable medium as the
statutory invention. See Examination Guidelines For Computer-Related
Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7482 (Feb. 28, 1996). Other preambles from
claims directed to software include, for example, “computer program product”
and “program storage device.” See Fenwick & West LLP, 2004 Report on
International Legal Protection for Computer Software, 21 No. 4 COMPUTER &
INTERNET LAWYER 1, 5 (2004) (noting gradual international acceptance of
program product claims). There are other variations to claim software-related
inventions as a manufacture (or machine) rather than a process. See generally
id.; Andrew J. Hollander, Patenting Computer Data Structures: The Ghost, the
Machine and the Federal Circuit, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 33 (2003)
(discussing patentability of data structures). Such claims in the Beauregard style
identify the invention as a computer-readable product and, as such, the article on
which the marking must appear. For a general discussion on patentable subject
matter and the patentability of computer software, see generally Robert Plotkin,
Computer Programming and the Automation of Invention: A Case for Software
Patent Reform, 2003 U.C.L.A. J. L. & TECH. 7 (2003); Richard S. Gruner,
Everything Old is New Again: Obviousness Limitations on Patenting Computer
Updates of Old Designs, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 209 (2003); Sam S. Han,
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287 could entail a patent notice appearing on a label for a CD or other
favored storage medium. However, perhaps because of space limitations or
branding aesthetics, marking does not often appear on the CD label itself,
the only practical area to mark “on” the CD. Rather, the “on the article”
requirement has led to patent listings in the user interface of the software.
Marking frequently appears as a familiar splash screen upon launch of the
enterprise software. Marking can also appear in a drop box along with other
legal notices or information. At first blush, marking according to these
conventions apparently complies with the letter of section 287 to achieve
constructive notice. However, resort to the purposes of the marking statute
may better inform whether conventional marking of software should
constitute constructive notice.
¶9
As previously noted, the fundamental purpose of marking is to help
avoid innocent infringement.21 With respect to non-licensees of enterprise
software, marking does not help prevent innocent infringement because
non-licensees lack access to reproduce the software product in the first
place. For example, direct shipment from the owner of enterprise software,
which is sealed until opened by the intended customer-licensee, restricts
non-licensees from access to the software product and its marking. As
another example, when marking involves patent listings on software
screens, licensing terms contractually permit only licensees, or their agents,
to access the software and patent notice therein. Unlike the traditional entry
of sold products into the free stream of commerce, there is no practical
potential for the non-licensed public to witness enterprise software or its
markings when commercialized in the conventional manner.22 Thus, hidden
enterprise software and its markings do not influence the conduct of nonlicensees, much less help them avoid innocent infringement.23

Analyzing the Patentability of “Intangible” Yet ”Physical” Subject Matter, 3
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2002).
21
Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398 (1936).
22
Perkins Coie, Patent Marking: Avoid Losing an Infringement Suit Before It
Begins, at www.perkinscoie.com/content/ren/updates/patent/091003.htm (Sept.
10, 2003) (“But merely marking products with the patent numbers is not enough
either – the products must also be shipped or sold so that others have notice of
the patent protection.”).
23
See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 64-65 (2001) (identifying “several imperfections” with the
marking statute including award of damages for innocent infringement by an
infringer who does not actually encounter a patented product). Of course, public
disclosure of only a patent listing in a software product – by, for example,
carving out the patent listing from contractual nondisclosure obligations – still
does not serve the purpose of section 287 if the product otherwise remains off
limits to the public. Because the public lacks legitimate access to enterprise

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 2

In contrast, marking may theoretically help prevent innocent
infringement with respect to enterprise software licensees. However, other
legal and contractual restrictions (e.g., copyright, confidentiality
obligations, and license limitations)24 and related notices that typically
appear more frequently in enterprise software also confer knowledge of
proprietary rights therein and warn end users against illegal reproduction or
further sale of the software.25 Thus, it is unclear how much patent marking
actually contributes to preventing innocent infringement given preexisting
appreciation of contractual limitations and the presence of other legal
notices.26
¶10

The other two purposes of section 287 – to encourage public notice
about a patented article and to aid the public in identifying patented articles
– also do not appear to be significantly furthered, if at all, by the marking of
enterprise software. As to the former purpose, in view of typical licensing
provisions that restrict access to a limited set of permitted end users, public
notice of patents covering the enterprise software is, as previously
discussed, never achieved.27 Owners of enterprise software have
deliberately elected product confidentiality to bolster competitiveness as the
more important business objective over public marking access to increase
patent damages. As to the latter purpose, marking aids only a small fraction
of the public: those relatively few licensees permitted to see the enterprise
software during the course of their paid-for use.
¶11

software, regardless of marking accessibility, the public cannot be deceived into
believing the software is free to copy.
24
See supra Part I.B.
25
Copyright vests in its owner the exclusive rights to, for example, reproduce,
prepare derivative works of, and distribute the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2000). A patent vests in its owner the right to exclude others from, for
example, making, using, and selling the patented technology. 35 U.S.C. § 271
(2000). Although the intellectual property theories differ in significant ways
(e.g., non-abstract idea versus expression protection) in the enterprise software
context, copyright and patent protections often vindicate the same primary
business interest: preventing unauthorized copying and sale. See Final Report
of the Nat’l Comm’n on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) 16-18 (July 31, 1978), at http://digital-lawonline.info/CONTU/contu1.html.
26
The general public (and even the bar) is arguably more familiar with the
concept of copyright than patent. See generally David A. Einhorn, Copyright
and Patent Protection for Computer Software: Are They Mutually Exclusive?,
30 IDEA 265 (1990) (discussing both copyright and patent protections). For
this reason, copyright notices, which are far more ubiquitous than patent
markings, are likely to better deliver warnings against misuse of proprietary
enterprise software.
27
See supra Part I.B.
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In certain circumstances, courts have acknowledged that some
discretion must be reserved in the patentee to choose the marking location.28
Therefore, an enterprise software company could attempt to characterize
marking on the software packaging as a permissible alternative to better
serve the purposes of section 287. However, this liberal interpretation of
section 287 is still contrary to the underlying policy of the marking statute
to avoid misleading the public into believing a product is free to copy.
First, enterprise software does not sit on store shelves with packaging
available for potential inspection by all. Because logistics surrounding
software delivery typically involve direct, sealed shipments from
manufacturing facility to intended customer that limit access to package
markings, such markings do not further the purposes of the marking statute
any more than product markings. Second, under applicable case law,
package marking when the patented article contains other writings fails to
comply with section 287.29 Because CD labels and software screens
normally contain other printings, such as company name, copyright notice,
and version information, marking on packaging instead of the product is
likely impermissible for enterprise software.30
¶12

¶13
The nature of enterprise software thus reveals discord between the
core purpose of marking and the literal requirements of the marking
statute.31 Specifically, marking does not prevent deception of the public
into believing the enterprise software is in the public domain because,
deprived of both the software and marking therein, the public cannot be
deceived in the first place.32 With no access to conventional embodiments
28

See, e.g., Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U.S. 29, 50 (1892) (stating that
“something must be left to the judgment of the patentee”).
29
Rutherford v. Trim-Tex, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 158, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
30
See supra ¶ 4. The reservation or creation of a dedicated screen to list patents
is presumably even easier than employing a CD label since screen design could
provide more space for the marking. Professor Chisum remarks that although
the patent owner enjoys some discretion about where to mark, many courts have
insisted on a showing of physical impossibility of marking on the product before
marking is permitted elsewhere. DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS §
20.03[7][c][iii] (1999). A patent notice on a CD (or in a screen generated by a
computer instructions stored in the CD) unlike, for example, an integrated
circuit, is not technically or commercially infeasible.
31
Software poses many unique issues regarding the application of patent law.
For example, interpretation of claim limitations under paragraph six of 42
U.S.C. § 112 in the software context defies easy resolution. See generally Tobi
C. Clinton, Infringement and Software Claimed Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6:
Software Function is the Important Part, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2000).
32
In analyzing sold products whose markings became invisible after product
installation, a lower court characterized a limited class of people who could
witness the markings before installation as the qualifying “public” under section
287. See Rutherford, 803 F. Supp. at 164 (“[T]he ‘public’ for which notice is
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of enterprise software or possible patent marking therein, the public could
not reasonably conclude that the software is in the public domain.33
Further, when owners of enterprise software deliberately and selectively
conceal access to their products and patent listings therein to all except
licensees, notions of fairness call into question whether patentees should be
allowed to, at the same time, charge the world with patent knowledge.34
Despite speculation to the contrary,35 patentees that conventionally mark
enterprise software CDs, or even their packaging, might not be entitled to
collect infringement damages based on a constructive notice theory.36

II. DISADVANTAGE IN CONVENTIONAL NOTICE PRACTICE
A. Risk in Attempted Marking
¶14
Since constructive notice is uncertain under even a liberal
interpretation of section 287, enterprise software companies could
reasonably decide that marking would serve little purpose. In fact, marking
could pose significant disadvantages.

Myriad reasons, both legal and non-legal, exist to not mark patented
enterprise software. The sheer length of marking verbiage may
detrimentally impact product aesthetics, perhaps an important marketing
consideration. Legal notices may add to apparent product complexity, the
hallmark of a doomed offering in an industry increasingly committed to
simplicity and user friendliness.37 Further, large patent portfolios and
¶15

provided are building contractors.”). In Rutherford, no legal constraints limited
theoretically broad access to those hidden markings, even if in practice few saw
them. In contrast, contractual and related legal obligations do foreclose broad
access to markings on enterprise software.
33
Toro Co. v. McCulloch Corp., 898 F. Supp. 679, 684-85 (D. Minn. 1995)
(explaining that “[i]f the device has not been released into public domain, there
is manifestly no possibility of the public innocently copying or imitating that
device”).
34
Where license agreements prohibit access to patented products by the
patentee’s competitors specifically, this question is especially relevant in
considering what knowledge, if any, should be imputed to competitors, likely a
primary infringement target of the patentee.
35
See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 17, at § 4.26[D] (instructing without explanation
that marking should go on the program medium, its packaging, or both).
36
Consideration of constructive notice should be a highly fact-intensive inquiry
performed on a case-by-case basis with due regard for the nature and extent of
the distribution and accessibility of the particular software offering at issue and
the degree to which the objectives of section 287 regarding prevention of public
deception are met.
37
See, e.g., Press Release, FileMaker, Small Businesses Tell Software Makers:
“Keep It Simple” (July 14, 2003), at
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evolving product lines can make accurate association between a product and
related patents a challenging task with potentially steep costs. Error in a
patent listing, which in litigation could be characterized as deception, can
implicate significant statutory fines for violation of the false marking
provision.38 In other countries false marking can even lead to criminal
liability.39 Thus, for products that are distributed abroad, special
consideration should be given to the desirability of marking and safeguards
to ensure accuracy.
¶16
Marking can also detrimentally expand the scope of litigation
discovery to reach deep into the patentee’s product design and strategy.40 In
a typical patent infringement suit, some information concerning a patentee’s
product offerings can be probative.41 When the patentee’s products are
marked, the markings are powerful admissions about the critical relevance
of the marked products to the patent claims in suit and related construction
issues.42 As a result, detailed and comprehensive discovery into marked

http://www.filemaker.com/releases/1030.html (announcing survey results that
demonstrate user desire for simplicity over complexity in software products);
SAP Info, The Software Works the Way I Do, No. 29 (June 3, 2000), at
http://www.sap.info/index.php4?ACTION=noframe&url=http://www.sap.info/p
ublic/en/print.php4/article/comvArticle-193333c63b51c696a9/en (underscoring
increasing user expectations about software ease of use and clarity); Scott
Berkun, The Importance of Simplicity (July/August 1999) at
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/enus/dnhfact/html/humanfactor8_4.asp.
38
35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2000) (stating that false markings “for the purpose of
deceiving the public” are punishable by fines of $500 for each offense.).
39
Hal J. Bohner, Patent Marking: Why to do it and how to do it, INTELL. PROP.
& TRADE REG. J., Spring 2003, at 1, 3; Gordon R. Moriarity, Patent Marking
Principles, BOSTON E-NET, Fall 2000, at http://www.bostonenet.org/newsletter/fall00-2.htm.
40
See Douglas E. Lumish & Matthew M. Sarboraria, Preserving the Crown
Jewels, Practical Strategies for Protecting Source Code in Patent Litigation
Discovery, 5 PAT. STRAT. & MGMT. 1 (2004) (explaining the danger of software
product source code disclosure in patent litigation discovery).
41
For example, patent law requires the inventor to describe the best mode
known at filing. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251
F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Comparison of a patentee’s commercial product
against the patent in suit is probative, but not necessarily dispositive, of the best
mode inquiry. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing discovery of relevant
information “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence”).
42
See Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 69 F.3d 554
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (affirming the summary judgment of an
infringement ruling by the district court, stating that its “purported comparison
of the accused device with an embodiment produced by the patentee” did not
constitute reversible error).
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products can become a virtual certainty, undesirably introducing evidence
that, for example, could complicate an otherwise straightforward prima
facie infringement showing by the patentee.43 Worse still, discovery
expanded to encompass the patentee’s product could unveil product detail
sufficient to support a patent counterclaim or separate suit by the accused
infringer. As a result, product marking could quickly turn the litigation tide
against the patentee.

B. The Problem with Letters to Trigger Damages
A conventional alternative to marking is the provision of a notice
letter as actual, rather than constructive, notice to the accused when
infringement arises. Federal Circuit decisions teach that proper provision of
actual notice requires (1) a charge of infringement (2) of specific patents (3)
against a specific accused device or activity (4) by the patentee.44 Receipt
by an accused infringer of a properly crafted notice letter can begin the
period over which patent damages are recoverable.45
¶17

¶18
However, the notice letter is necessarily delayed at least until the
infringement is detected, which often comes well after the onset of
infringement. Software infringements, especially in the enterprise arena,
can be uniquely difficult to detect. Limited comprehension of softwarerelated accused devices based on, for example, their confidentiality and
relative insusceptibility to reverse engineering, can render infringement
detection a very formidable challenge.46

43

Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2001) (noting that beyond intrinsic
evidence, courts can consider anything helpful for claim construction as
extrinsic evidence). Determination of a patent infringement claim involves a
two-step inquiry: (1) claim construction to determine the limits of the scope and
the meaning of the asserted claims, and (2) comparison of the claims with the
allegedly infringing devices or methods to determine whether the latter embody
every limitation of the asserted claims. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Because claim construction is a question
of law, the standard of review is de novo. Id. at 1456. The second step in
determining whether an accused device or method infringes an asserted claim,
either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact, for
which the standard of review is clear error. See Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat
Contracting, Inc., 161 F.3d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
44
Lans v. Digital Equipment Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
45
Amsted Indus. Inc., 24 F.3d at 187.
46
See, e.g., Jeff Moore, Sources for Patent Infringement Investigations and
Patent Search Services on the Internet, at
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Another significant disadvantage of notice letters is the potential
creation of reasonable apprehension of suit, a jurisdictional predicate to a
claim for declaratory relief.47 On that basis, a notice letter recipient, if first
to file, is empowered to deprive the patentee of its desired judicial forum
and otherwise sabotage its enforcement strategy.48 Notwithstanding
industry attempts to carefully draft notice letters that simultaneously impart
actual notice yet sidestep creation of a justiciable controversy, the Federal
Circuit has refused to provide a safe harbor or other definitive guidance on
how to trigger one without the other.49
¶19

¶20
Notice letters therefore pose disadvantages to patent enforcement
efforts. From their causal dependence on the discovery of infringement,

http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/bp98/moore.htm (last visited Jan. 13,
2005) (discussing difficulty in, and resources for, detecting patent infringement).
47
Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887-88 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(regarding claims brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2201). The requirements for a declaratory judgment action are (1) a charge of
infringement, or resort to the totality of circumstances, that puts the accused
infringer under reasonable apprehension that the patentee will sue, and (2) an
immediate intention and ability of the accused infringer to engage in activity that
would be adversely impacted by the suit. See id.
48
See Peter J. Shurn III, Using Declaratory Judgments Offensively in Patent
Cases, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 6 (2003), available at
http://www.jmls.edu/ripl/vol3/issue1.htm. The option to file first also allows the
accused infringer, for example, to protect a new product offering, to protect
reputation or image, to protect customers, to send a message to the industry, to
bolster negotiating leverage, or to distract or confuse the patentee. Id. at 13.
49
See EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811-12 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The
Federal Circuit has acknowledged that the requirements for actual notice under
section 287 are not coextensive with those for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Adv. Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
For example, a patentee’s offer to license a patent by itself – enough to trigger
actual notice – is usually insufficient to create a justiciable controversy. EMC
Corp., 89 F.3d at 811-12. However, inherent complexity in identification of a
justiciable controversy renders uncertain even informed attempts to implicate
section 287 without the Declaratory Judgment Act:
This court’s two-part test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction is
designed to police the sometimes subtle line between cases in which the
parties have adverse interests and cases in which those adverse interests
have ripened into a dispute that may properly be deemed a controversy.
. . . In the end, the question is whether the relationship between the
parties can be considered a “controversy,” and that inquiry does not
turn on whether the parties have used particular “magic words” in
communicating with one another.
Id.
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they fail to preserve a full measure of potential damages to secure complete
justice for the patentee.50 Unintended implication of the Declaratory
Judgment Act can also weigh against dispatch of notice letters.

III. ALTERNATIVE CONTEXTUAL THEORIES TO OPTIMIZE DAMAGES
A. Impossibility of a Deceived Public
¶21
If an attempt to mark enterprise software is deemed legally futile or
otherwise undesirable, the patentee has other strategies to seek damages
greater than those secured by notice letter alone. For example, marking is
not necessary for asserted method claims of a patent having no apparatus
claims, even when the patentee markets a related product.51 As suggested
by case law, when a patent contains both method and apparatus claims, and
a patented product is amenable to marking, the product must be marked to
achieve constructive notice, thereby starting the damages clock for any
asserted claim.52 However, when the patentee does not sell any patented
product at all, and there is no product to mark, full damages are recoverable
from the onset of infringement without any notice.53

50

See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 65 (2001) (stating that the actual notice requirement wastes
social resources and provides incentive to knowingly infringe until the infringer
receives actual notice).
51
ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 9.4(b) (4th ed.
1998). See Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387,
395 (1936) (“If respondent’s position is correct, process patents and patents
under which nothing has been manufactured may be secretly infringed with
impunity, notwithstanding injury to owners guilty of no neglect.”). This rule’s
application deserves further consideration when a patent contains only method
claims covering software product functionality, and with trivial modification
could, but does not, also contain a product claim.
52
Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (“Where the patent contains both apparatus and method claims, however,
to the extent that there is a tangible item to mark by which notice of the asserted
method claims can be given, a party is obliged to do so if it intends to avail itself
of the constructive notice provisions of section 287(a).”); Douglas J. Bucklin,
Patent Marking Requirements – Patented Articles Must Be Marked as Patented
in Order for Patentee to Recover Damages Due to Patent Infringement,
FindLaw for Corporate Counsel (Dec. 19, 2002) (suggesting some ambiguity in
case law), at
http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00305/008547/title/Subject/topic/Intell
ectual%20Property_Patents/filename/intellectualproperty_2_4593.
53
See, e.g., Wine Ry. Appliance Co., 297 U.S. at 398. Others have also noted
this result discouraging the sale of patented products. E.g., Carl Oppedahl,
Patent Marking Of Systems, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
205, 211 (1995) (“From this it will be appreciated that from the point of view of
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One commentator explained the marking rationale as follows:
A helpful jurisprudential model for § 287 . . . is that of estoppel or
reliance: a patent owner who sells a patented product but does not
mark it may be understood to have led the public to believe that it is
not patented, and thus cannot be heard to complain for damages if a
member of the public who has not been given actual notice of the
patent chooses to copy the product.54

Likewise, when a patented product is not sold, the patent owner has not led
the public into believing anything. This reliance model makes sense for
sold products and their markings that move freely through the stream of
public commerce under the first sale or exhaustion doctrine55 to potentially
impact public behavior.56
¶23
By contrast, the flow of licensed enterprise software including its
markings is significantly constrained by contractual prohibitions forbidding
movement. From the public’s perspective, the inaccessibility of such
enterprise software renders it essentially invisible. The public therefore
remains unaffected by a patent listing in a restricted software product it
cannot witness.57

monetary damages and associated proof it is better as a patent owner never to
have sold the patented product than to have sold it, since if no product has been
sold, then damages will run from the start of the infringement.”).
54
Oppedahl, supra note 53, at 11
55
See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“The unrestricted sale of a patented article, by or with the authority
of the patentee, “exhausts” the patentee's right to control further sale and use of
that article by enforcing the patent under which it was first sold.”).
56
Professor Chisum also apparently emphasizes the importance of public
impact, questioning a literal reading of section 287 when it conflicts with the
fundamental purpose of the statute:
Section 287 literally specifies “making or selling,” and it can be argued
that marking is required even if the patentee neither sells nor authorizes
others to sell (e.g. when a patent owner makes and uses a patented
machine and sells only the unpatented products thereof), but that literal
reading is contrary to the rationale behind the statute identified in Wine
Railway, to wit, to protect against deception of the public by the
distribution of unmarked patented articles.
CHISUM, supra note 30, at § 20.03[7][c][ii] (emphasis in original).
To the extent that limited licenses of enterprise software do not impact the
public at large as outright sales of products do, licensing should not be deemed
equivalent to “selling” under section 287. Cf. Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (comparing license with sale
in different on-sale bar context).
57
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As proposed above, enterprise software markings in conventional
embodiments do not likely serve a compelling public notice function.58
Thus, a patentee providing enterprise software could cite an undeceived
public to argue against a requirement of marking to recover full damages for
any kind of claims in suit, whether method or apparatus, or both.59
Although there appears to be no case law on point, the argument parallels
the obviation of marking to recover full damages when there is no product
at all to mark. In both cases, the general public lacks access to any patented
product and therefore cannot be misled into believing a patented product is
free to copy.60 Appropriate judicial focus on the fundamental policy of
section 287, to prevent innocent infringement, rather than mechanical
adherence to its letter would support this approach to render marking
unnecessary.61
¶24

58

See supra Part I.B.
Whether a claim directed to enterprise software recites a product or method,
or both, is often an arbitrary decision, at least when patentees target only users
of the patented technology. Artful drafting of substantive claim limitations can
render differences between a product claim and a method claim largely a matter
of form. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,771,303 (issued Aug. 3, 2004) (reciting
method and apparatus claims formalistically differing only by preamble). Of
course, the distinction between product and method claims does substantively
impact enforcement strategies targeting manufacturers of the patented
technology, most notably competitors of the patentee. See Burt Magen, Media
Claims for Software Inventions, 20 NO. 11 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 1, 2
(Nov. 2003) (noting undesirable resort to contributory infringement allegation to
target software maker or distributor).
60
This result also promotes uniformity. Because the presence of a single
product claim may require patent notice when method claims alone do not, the
scope of recoverable patent damages unreasonably turns on formality. See
supra ¶¶ 21-22 (explaining that without notice full damages are available for
patents having only method claims but not patents having apparatus claims).
61
The Federal Circuit has rejected rote application of section 287 in at least one
other context. See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 792 F.2d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Observing the futility of constructive notice to a U.S. government bound
to non-patent strictures that render the government powerless to avoid
infringement, the Motorola court explained:
59

In light of [government procurement policy], a notice to the
Government would be meaningless since the contracting agency must
award the contract to the lowest bidder regardless of any patent
infringement problems. This policy, therefore, does not take into
consideration a fundamental rationale supporting section 287—
supplying notice in order to prevent innocent infringement. Wine
Railway, 297 U.S. at 394 . . . . Since the government does not consider
the question whether the device it takes by eminent domain is protected
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B. Attempted Marking as Actual Notice to Licensees
¶25
While a claim for increased damages by marking to accomplish
constructive notice might prove unsuccessful, and a resort to ad hoc notice
by letter inadequate, a secondary, alternate theory of actual notice may
succeed in maximizing remedies against a discrete class of defendants:
patented enterprise software licensees. Case law provides that actual notice
is not negated when the patent owner requests a license instead of ceasing
the infringement.62 In an unpublished decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed
a lower court holding that even a letter cautioning about future infringement
could constitute actual notice.63 At least one federal district court has also
recognized that acknowledgment by an accused infringer that it received
notice establishes actual notice, even if the original notice was flawed.64
¶26
This precedent informs issues of notice to licensees of marked
enterprise software. At a fundamental level, any license is a communication
by the licensor patentee that certain activities are contractually permitted
while all others, if undertaken in violation of the license, are prohibited and
infringing. If a licensed customer of patented enterprise software breaches
the license, the customer may become a patent infringer as to its activities
constituting the breach.65 In the event of such a breach, a typical enterprise

by patents or not, requiring a patent owner to mark his device or give
notice pursuant to section 287 would be meaningless in this context.
Id. at 771-72.
See, e.g., SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Adv. Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (“Thus, the actual notice requirement of § 287(a) is satisfied when the
recipient is informed of the identity of the patent and the activity that is believed
to be an infringement, accompanied by a proposal to abate the infringement,
whether by license or otherwise.”).
63
CHISUM, supra note 30 at § 20.03[7][c][iv] n.179 (citing T.D. Williamson Inc.
v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 606, (N.D. Okla. 1989), aff’d, 923 F.2d 871 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (unpublished)) for proposition that a “cautionary” letter warning of,
not past or present, but rather future patent infringement constitutes sufficient
notice). The Laymon court stated that “warning of infringement is not lessened
because the act of infringement has not yet occurred; no law requires an
infringement to have taken place prior to an effective notice of infringement.”
Laymon, 723 F. Supp. at 606.
64
Wokas v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 978 F. Supp. 839, 846 (N.D. Ind. 1997)
(quoting Chubb Integrated Sys., Inc v. Nat’l Bank of Washington, 658 F. Supp.
1043, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1987) for proposition that “[w]hen one acknowledges . . .
that the adversary is claiming infringement, the law most certainly does not
compel the patent owner to repeat it more explicitly”).
65
For example, the licensee might appropriate a certain functionality of the
enterprise software for the licensee’s own commercial product rather than limit
its use of the patented product for internal purposes only, a typical restriction in
62
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license could be deemed to satisfy the first, third, and fourth elements of
actual notice, as identified by the Federal Circuit and set out in part II.B of
this paper.66
For example, a customer might continue to use the enterprise
software in a manner otherwise permitted by the license, even after material
breach by the customer and related notice by the owner to thereupon
terminate its license to use. Since a request for a license is a proper
alternative to a charge of infringement, a consummated license agreement
between the patentee and the infringer should be no less proper than a
cautionary infringement charge, satisfying the first element of actual notice.
With respect to the third and fourth elements, the license agreement serves
as an express identification by the patentee and the infringer of the
permitted and unpermitted activity and, as such, a cautionary charge of
infringement regarding the latter.67 Countersignature on the license
agreement by a licensee-turned-infringer could be deemed the infringer’s
acknowledgment of the need for a license to the patented enterprise
software. Under applicable case law, such acknowledgment would excuse
any defects in the ability of the license agreement to qualify as notice.68
¶27

enterprise software licenses. See SCOTT, supra note 17, at § 12.02[c]
(identifying common provisions in software licenses).
66
Lans v. Digital Equipment Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (identifying requirements for actual notice).
67
An enterprise software license agreement contains express statements about
permissible use of the licensed software. Very often, the license agreement also
includes express restrictions or prohibitions regarding product use. See, e.g.,
SCOTT, supra note 17, at § 12.02 (listing typical prohibitions in licensing
agreements); Software License and Service Agreement between E.piphany, Inc.
and eGroups, Inc., ¶ 2.2(B) (March 3, 2000), at
http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agreements/egroups/epiphany.lic.2000.03
.03.html (“Customer agrees not to cause or permit the reverse engineering,
disassembly or decompilation of Applications, except to the extent required to
obtain interoperability with other independently created software or as specified
by law.”). Even when explicit identification of infringing activity is absent, it
can be directly implied by the scope of the express license. For example, what if
the license expressly permitted only internal business use by the licensee, but the
licensee, in fact, incorporated patented technology into its own product
offerings? Of course the more explicit the agreement provisions regarding
activities constituting infringement, the more likely the license agreement could
qualify as the required, albeit anticipatory, charge of infringement. The
E.piphany Agreement provides in pertinent part: “E.piphany grants to Customer
a nonexclusive license . . . to use the Applications solely for Customer's
operations . . . Customer shall not copy or use the Applications . . . except as
specified in this Agreement of this Order Form . . . .” Id. at ¶¶ 2.1(A)-(B).
68
Wokas, 978 F. Supp. at 846.
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Identification of specific patents, the second element of actual
notice, does not commonly appear in enterprise software license
agreements. However, a typical licensee learns of patent rights in the
software by its access to the software or, more specifically, a screenshot or
other location in which the attempted marking appears.69 The appearance of
an infringed patent in a patent listing on some portion of enterprise software
should constitute the required specific identification of infringed patents
under actual notice principles.70
¶28

¶29
Licensees of enterprise software can typically receive actual notice
of patent rights.71 While delivery of notice to licensees as proposed may not
precisely mirror the traditional provision of an infringement notice letter,
licensees might receive as much patent infringement information as letter
recipients. In the absence of explicit case law on point, fairness favors
recognition that, by virtue of their actual knowledge and ready access to
patent notices otherwise invisible to the public at large, licensees should be
subject to early damages liability.72

69

But see supra Part II.A (identifying significant risk in patent listings). When
the alleged infringement concerns excessive copies of the licensed software, all
listed patents are implicated. When alleged infringement involves
misappropriation of a discrete patented functionality for use in, for example, the
infringer’s own commercial offering, the infringer may struggle to know which
of many patents listed in the software are at issue. However, that struggle is no
different from the public’s effective receipt of constructive notice from a large
patent listing on a public product.
70
While conventional marking of enterprise software would likely suffice to
support a claim of actual notice, a patent listing in the license itself would
perhaps more closely mirror the conventional notice letter containing both the
infringement charge and the patents allegedly infringed in a single document.
See Lans, 252 F.3d at 1327-28; Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187 (identifying requirements
for actual notice). Similarly, case law may not welcome notices that predate the
onset of infringement. But see CHISUM, supra note 30 at § 20.03[7][c][iv] n.179
(citing T.D. Williamson Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 606, (N.D. Okla.
1989), aff’d, 923 F.2d 871 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (unpublished)) (discussing
cautionary infringement notices). To prepare for that possibility, patentees
could consider making the license agreement available in the software for access
during software use. That way, notice could be deemed to be ongoing, with
appearance of the license agreement at some point following infringement.
71
Assigning knowledge of patents listed in concealed markings to non-licensees
would be fundamentally inequitable. See supra Part I.B (noting inability of the
public to access patent markings).
72
An actual notice finding in the enterprise software context should of course
follow a highly fact-intensive inquiry with due consideration of the information
imparted to the licensee-turned-infringer.
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CONCLUSION
¶30
Marking enterprise software in the conventional manner does not
likely further the fundamental purpose of the marking statute. For this
reason, full recovery of damages based on mechanical compliance with
section 287 is uncertain at best. A primary, alternative theory to support
damages unbounded by the delivery of notice is based on analogy between
two situations: (1) patents under which no products are distributed to the
public, and (2) the inaccessibility to the public of markings in enterprise
software products, both rendering impossible a public deceived into
believing that products are free to exploit. A secondary, alternative theory
based on actual notice may preserve full damages against licensees of
patented enterprise software, even if such damages cannot be recovered
against all infringers. From their access to enterprise software, licensees
can, and often do, learn pertinent information about applicable patent rights
and should be held accountable for such knowledge. Although case law has
not squarely addressed these proposed notice theories, they are supported by
the underlying objective of the marking statute, case law, and general
principles of fairness.

